



Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment
and Housing Authority,
U.S____ No. 85-5915, 87 D.A.R. 367
(Jan. 14, 1987).
Tenants Have Private Right Of
Action To Enforce Federal Law
On Rent Ceiling
The United States Supreme Court
held that tenants have a private right of
action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983
against a public housing authority which
violates a federal law limiting rents in
public housing to a specified percentage
of the tenants' income. The case is a
potentially important one in interpreting
the area of law currently in flux on
when a private plaintiff may maintain a
private right of action under section 1983
for state violations of federal law.
The Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C.
section 1401 et seq., as amended by
the Brooke Amendment, specifies that
public housing tenants pay rent set at a
formula determined by their monthly
incomes. The federal agency charged
with enforcement, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), has consistently interpreted
"rent" to include a reasonable amount
for use of utilities. See 24 C.F.R. section
685.740 et seq.
Plaintiff tenants alleged that defend-
ant public housing authority did not
establish the reasonable utility services
pursuant to HUD regulations, and so
was illegally charging the tenants for
"excess" utilities which should have been
part of the rent. They sued under 42
U.S.C. section 1983, alleging a depriva-
tion of their civil rights.
The district court granted summary
judgment for defendants, holding that
the Brooke Amendment did not provide
any private right of action for enforce-
ment. Rather, the court reasoned, rights
conferred by the Brooke Amendment
were enforceable only by HUD. 605
F.Supp. 532 (W.D.Va. 1984). The Fourth
Circuit affirmed, drawing the analogy
that HUD was the trustee for the ten-
ants, and therefore only it could bring
suit. 771 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1985).
The Supreme Court, per Justices
White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens, reversed. The Court held
that (1) an enforceable right is created
by the statute; and (2) Congress evinced
no intent to vest enforcement exclusively
in HUD. On the first point, there was
no substantial dispute that the statute
and the regulations created enforceable
rights; even the Fourth Circuit had so
held. Thus the case fell outside the ambit
of the landmark Pennhurst case, Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), which
sharply limited the private causes of
action available to plaintiffs seeking to
enforce federal law.
The case turned on the second point,
with the Supreme Court overturning the
appellate court's determination that
Congress had created a scheme of ad-
ministrative enforcement which fore-
closed a private right of action under
section 1983. Unlike earlier cases, see,
e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), there is
no specific judicial or administrative
remedy that would preclude a private
right of action under section 1983. Al-
though there is an administrative griev-
ance procedure, that procedure does not
contemplate adjudicating disputes deal-
ing with the Brooke Amendment, or
class actions; moreover, it is at bottom a
state procedure, which generally does
not preclude section 1983 suits.
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor
and Powell dissented, and would have
held that no enforceable rights were




Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank,
Abascal v. Crocker National Bank,
San Francisco Superior Court,
Nos. 720307, 720309 (Feb. 15, 1987).
Class Action Settlement Against Banks
For Overdraft Charges Disapproved
In a surprise decision on a proposed
class action settlement involving, inter
alia, excessive bank charges for bounced
checks, the San Francisco Superior
Court ruled that the settlement could
not be approved because the class repre-
sentatives could not represent all the
class members affected by the settlement.
For several years, many suits have
been pending against almost every major
bank in California for excessive fees
charged on checking accounts for,
among other things, checks returned for
Nonsufficient Funds (NSF, or bounced
checks) or for Uncollected Funds (UCF,
or where the deposit against which the
check is written has not yet cleared);
stop payment orders; counter checks;
wiring funds; and a host of other service
charges. Generally speaking, all of the
suits are class actions, each distinguish-
able by classes charged for particularized
fees for services against particular banks
during particular time periods. The grav-
amen of the suits is, for example, that
banks charge $10 or more for NSF
checks which allegedly cost the banks
no more than $1 to process.
The suits had been wending their
way through the court system, with
many stayed until the various legal
theories were tested. The legal theories
-usually breach of contract, uncon-
scionability and violations of the Unfair
Business Practices Act-were unsettled
until the California Supreme Court de-
cided Perdue v. Crocker National Bank,
38 Cal. 3d 913 (1985). The court held
that the signature card for checking
accounts did constitute a contract, but
that it was a contract of adhesion,
imposing on the banks a duty of good
faith and fair dealing with their cus-
tomers in regard to imposing and chang-
ing fees and service charges.
Following this widely-publicized de-
cision, the cases began to move again
toward trial. In September 1986, the
first of the cases slated for trial were
announced as settled. Following lengthy
negotiations in which former U.S. Attor-
ney General Benjamin Civiletti served
as mediator, attorneys for two of the
plaintiff classes-those against Crocker
and Wells Fargo, which had merged in
March 1986 for NSF charges incurred
during the 1970s and early 1980s-
announced a comprehensive settlement.
The settlement purported to compro-
mise all claims for all charges against
the defendant banks. The settlement in-
cluded an amended complaint that ex-
panded the class to include all bank
consumers-checking account holders as
well as savings and other account hold-
ers-back to the date of the original
class and all future account holders, for
not only NSF charges, but an additional
twenty distinct service charges. Mone-
tary relief was accorded only to those
who no longer had accounts at the
banks, for 30% of each NSF charge the
depositor could document back to 1973.
Those who still held accounts were given
the choice of choosing one of two ser-
vices the banks were marketing-over-
draft protection or a credit card-free
for one year. NSF charges were rolled
back for one year, but an increased fee
of $15 thereafter was ratified. All future
suits were barred. There were also minor
changes mandated in notice to con-
sumers and the handling of NSF checks
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1987)112
LITIGATION ml
for small amounts. In essence, the settle-
ment adopted the banks' contention that
each account carried a "bundle" of ser-
vices that could not be segregated.
The proposed settlement evoked pro-
tests from consumer advocates other
than the settling attorneys. In presenta-
tions to the court, as well as an adver-
tisement signed by the class representa-
tives and Ralph Nader, the settlement
was criticized for reaching out to settle
other cases, for providing a "blueprint"
for other banks' suits which was dis-
advantageous to consumers, and for the
magnitude of the $3.65 million attorneys'
fees included in the settlement. The class
attorneys defended the settlement on the
grounds that it was the best that could
be achieved in the face of difficult proof
problems and adverse decisions on the
merits in other jurisdictions, and that
the settlement was worth as much as
$100 million to the class. The banks did
not verify the cost to them, but did
assert that it was rational way to settle
all the suits at once, and comported
with their "bundle of services" theory.
San Francisco Superior Court Judge
Isabella Grant gave preliminary approv-
al to the settlement, allowing it to be
sent as notification to all class members
for objection and opting out. Following
a hearing, Judge Grant reversed position
and disapproved the settlement, holding
that the class could not be certified for
settlement because it was expanded to
include fees other than NSF charges.
She pointed out that until the final
stages of negotiations, the ten-year his-
tory of the litigation had focused solely
on NSF items. She specifically rejected
the banks' contention that banks provide
a bundle of services that must be con-
sidered in the context of the entirety of
the bank-customer relationship. NSF
charges are imposed on less than 10% of
all checking accounts, and only half of
checking account customers also have
savings accounts. In particular, the
class representatives had only checking
accounts, and incurred only NSF charges.
The court therefore held that there
were potentially antagonistic divergen-
cies within the expanded group of all
bank customers that prevented approval
of the proposed class for settlement.
The court took special aim at the banks'
preference for the "bundle of services"
theory as the very source of the diver-
gencies since, if true, charges for one
service might well subsidize another.
Moreover, the services traditionally had
separate charges based not only on cost
but also deterrence. Putting all charges
into a single monthly service fee would
force some customers to pay for services
they never in fact use. Given thesc facts,
the court held there was not a sufficient-
ly well-defined community of interest
among the plaintiff class members. This
lack of community was evidenced by,
on the one hand, the lack of any benefit
afforded the NSF class for agreeing to
pxpand the class to achieve settlement
and, on the other hand, no monetary
benefit at all for the other class members
pulled into the expanded class.
According to all sides, the decision
has eliminated any further possibility
of settlement, and the cases will move
to trial.
AFL-CIO, et al. v. Deukmejian,
Sacramento Superior Court,
No. 348195A2
Suit Filed To Challenge Governor's
Interpretation of Proposition 65
A coalition of labor, environmental
and political groups have filed suit
against Governor Deukmejian for his
failure to include on the list of cancer-
causing chemicals all of the substances
allegedly required by Proposition 65.
Proposition 65, passed by California
voters by a nearly two-to-one margin at
the November 1986 general election,
requires, inter alia, that the Governor
on or before March 1, 1987 publish a
list of "those chemicals known to the
state to cause cancer or reproductive
toxicity." Following publication, those
chemicals will be subject to strict stand-
ards regarding exposure to the public or
introduction into drinking water sources.
The list is to be updated annually, as
chemicals are identified as causing cancer
and reproductive toxicity in the opinion
of the state's qualified experts appointed
by the Governor. The law requires that
the first list "shall include at a minimum
those substances identified by reference
in Labor Code Section 6382(b)(1) and
... Section 6382(d)." Those Labor Code
sections identify the lists of carcinogenic
chemicals published by the National
Toxicology Project (NTP) and the
United Nations International Agency
for Research on Cancer (IARC). Dis-
carding overlapping items, the combined
NTP and IARC lists include 264
chemicals.
On February 27, the Governor pub-
lished a list of only 29 chemicals, inter-
preting the initiative to require only the
listing of chemicals shown to cause
cancer in humans, to the exclusion of
those established by scientific protocol
in laboratory tests to be carcinogens or
reproductive hazards.
A petition for a peremptory writ of
mandate and injunctive relief was im-
mediately filed by the AFL-CIO, Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club,
Campaign California, Citizens for a
Better Environment, Silicon Valley
Toxics Coalition, and farmworker Ber-
nardo Huerto. The suit seeks a writ
directing the Governor to immediately
issue an amended list adding the remain-
ing chemicals listed by NTP and IARC.
The suit is pending in Sacramento
Superior Court.
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